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Catastrophic climatic events have accounted for 72% of global insurance claims and
totaled ~$1 trillion from 1980 to 2012. Costs are driven by socio-economic developments
and an increased frequency and severity of climatic disasters in which climate change
may have been a contributing factor. Climate change is projected to become a more
prominent driver of these changes in the decades ahead. Government policies to reduce
systemic risk have been the predominant approach for multi-level mitigation and
adaptation to climate change. The analysis presented here shows how forceful and
effective market-based approaches for adaptation and mitigation to climate change
already operate via the insurance industry. Feedbacks from insurance to society include
these primary changes: 1) premiums and insurance policies, 2) non-coverage, and 3)
policy making and litigation (Chapter 1). Through these mechanisms, the insurance
industry actively manages climate change adaptations and creates incentives to lessen
impacts on industry and society. For mitigation of climate change, renewable energybased energy production has become more of a priority for utilities in recent years
(Chapter 2). However, renewable energy is competitively disadvantaged compared to
fossil-fuel based systems due to high investment costs, the intermittent nature of

renewables, and a lack of pricing for externalities (Chapter 2). A model is used for
calculating the total cost of a renewable utility and the cost of energy for that utility.
Three scenarios were modeled (a null scenario with no incentive, an existing incentive in
Nebraska, and a federal incentive that until recently was available to renewable utilities)
to show the effects of incentives on the cost of production to the utility and the costs to
the incentive providers. In Nebraska, the incentive was found to provide some relief to
the utility compared to the null scenario and the federal incentive provided significantly
more relief to the utility. Costs for the incentive investor with the federal incentive were
significantly higher than with the Nebraska incentive, compared to the null scenario. To
develop renewable-energy production and mitigate climate change impacts, incentives
enable market entry where externalities for fossil fuels are not adequately priced.
Adaptation to climate change requires thorough understanding of how the impacts affect
society (Chapter 1) and how society might mitigate and adapt to the impacts of climate
change (Chapter 2).
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Chapter 1
Climate Change Feedbacks Via Insurance
Introduction
Government policies have been the predominant multi-level approach to adapt to and
mitigate the impacts of climate change1,2. Yet, past political agreements have been largely
unsuccessful to reduce global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions necessary to avert
probable widespread catastrophic effects2,3 and it is still too early to tell if the Conference
of the Parties (COP) 21 agreement from December 2015 will succeed in reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. Scientific and political controversies related to climate change
have delayed policy implementation and future agreements will probably slowly be
established4,5. The third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction produced an
agreement, but was found to lack proactive engagement of climate change and indicated a
gap in communication between the scientific community and policymakers6. While
persistent limitations exist for creating effective global policies, the recent costs of
climate change provide active feedbacks to business and society via the market
mechanism of the insurance industry7,8,9,10,11. Feedbacks via insurance (i.e. a one-way
reaction from the insurance industry to society in response to societal and environmental
stimuli), have been under-recognized as mechanisms to induce adaptation and mitigation
to climate change, primarily via the mechanisms of premium adjustments and insurance
policy changes, non-coverage, and policy making and litigation. This analysis is the first
to document the range of insurance-related feedbacks as adaptation and mitigation
strategies.
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Downside risks (risks with negative outcomes, such as losses) associated with
weather-related disaster events are increasingly managed by the insurance industry, the
largest global economic sector with revenue of $4.6 trillion or 7% of the global economy
in 20118. Catastrophic climatic events have accounted for 72% of global property and
casualty insurance claims and insured losses from 1980 to 2015, totaling $0.98 trillion,
and these costs have been steadily increasing (Figure 1). The majority of global insured
losses have occurred in North America, Central America, and the Caribbean12. These
costs only account for catastrophic events, which are 40% of total insured losses
compared to 60% of losses from smaller events13.

400,000.00

US$m Losses (Real 2015)

350,000.00
300,000.00

Overall Losses
y=

44805e0.0398x
R² = 0.438

Insured Losses
y = 7063.6e0.0593x
R² = 0.565

250,000.00
200,000.00
150,000.00
100,000.00
50,000.00
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Figure 1.1. Increasing overall and insured losses globally from 1980 to 2015 for
catastrophic events only. Source: Munich Re 2016.
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Estimated weather-related costs have been ~0.5% of annual, global Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) and real costs are increasing at ~6% per year5. Furthermore,
recent projections estimate that $0.24-0.51 trillion in U.S. property will be below sea
level by 210014. In 2016, the World Economic Forum ranked extreme weather events and
natural catastrophes as the second and fifth most probable global economic risks to occur
in the next 10 years15. Additionally, failure of climate change adaptation was ranked first
in estimated negative global economic impacts over the next 10 years15. Socioeconomic
development has been a primary factor for the rapid increase in recent global costs from
climatic events10 and an increased frequency and magnitude of weather-related natural
catastrophe costs (Figure 1.2) will result from the future interaction of climate change and
socioeconomic development8,9,10,16,17. In addition, future economic costs will probably
significantly increase if climate change is abrupt instead of gradual10,18.
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Figure 1.2. Increasing loss events globally from 1980-2013 by type of event. Source:
Munich Re.

Because of the nonlinear changes associated with climate (e.g. sea-level rise),
experience over the last 50-100 years has been identified as an ineffective predictor of
future insurance losses8. Table 1.1 lists the top 10 costliest disasters by overall losses
from 1980-2015, all of which occurred 1994 or after and seven of which occurred in the
last 10 years. As conditions change due to climate change, the ability to effectively
determine risk is reduced4,5,13.
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Table 1.1. Ten costliest events ordered by overall losses worldwide 1980-2015 Source:
Munich Re.
Date

11.3.2011

Event

Affected Area

Overall Losses

Insured losses

in US$ m

in US$ m

210,000

40,000

15,880

United States: LA, MS, AL, FL

125,000

60,500

1,720

Earthquake,

Japan: Aomori, Chiba, Fukushima,

tsunami

Ibaraki, Iwate, Miyagi, Tochigi,

Fatalities

Tokyo, Yamagata
25-30.8.2005

Hurricane
Katrina, storm
surge

17.1.1995

Earthquake

Japan: Hyogo, Kobe, Osaka, Kyoto

100,000

3,000

6,430

12.5.2008

Earthquake

China: Sichuan, Mianyang,

85,000

300

84,000

68,500

29,500

210

44,000

15,300

61

43,000

16,000

813

38,000

18,500

170

30,000

8,000

520

28,000

760

46

Beichuan, Wenchuan, Shifang,
Chengdu, Guangyuan, Ngawa,
Ya'an
23-31.10.2012

Hurricane Sandy,

Bahamas, Cuba, Dominican

storm surge

Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Puerto
Rico, United States, Canada

17.1.1994

Earthquake

United States: Northridge, Los
Angeles, San Fernando Valley,
Ventura

1.8-15.11.2011

Floods,

Thailand: Phichit, Nakhon Sawan,

landslides

Phra Nakhon Si Ayuttaya,
Phthumthani, Nonthaburi, Bangkok

6-14.9.2008

Hurricane Ike

United States, Cuba, Haiti,
Dominican Republic, Turks and
Caicos Islands, Bahamas

27.2.2010

Earthquake,

Chile: Concepción, Metropolitana,

tsunami

Rancagua, Talca, Temuco,
Valparaiso

23./24./27.10.2004

Earthquake

Japan: Honshu, Niigata, Ojiya,
Tokyo, Nagaoka, Yamakoshi
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Insurers function on a few assumptions about insurable risks: they are quantifiable
(the risk is largely constant over the insurable period and well understood, assuming the
law of large numbers), diversifiable (one type of risk may not be a function of another,
such as home and auto insurance being independent), fortuitous (may or may not
happen), and economically priced (the policyholder can afford to pay)19. The three
primary feedback mechanisms used by insurance to manage and drive adaptation and
mitigation are changes in premium prices and insurance policies, non-coverage, and
policy making and litigation (Figure 1.3). The following sections describe the forceful
and extensive mechanisms by which the insurance industry manages private property,
infrastructure, energy, agriculture, healthcare, and government.

Figure 1.3. Cycle of feedbacks from climate change via insurance.
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Feedbacks via Premium Prices and Policy-induced Adaptation
Insurance is a risk management tool which absorbs ~40% of costs from catastrophes in
developed countries20. Insurance premiums act as a signal of the average probability of a
loss9. Premiums from policyholders cover claims, administration fees, and offer a profit
to insurers over a designated time period21. Insurers will only offer catastrophe insurance
if premiums are able to be priced sufficiently and where risks are not excessively
uncertain22,23,24. As natural disasters increase in frequency and severity, premiums must
increase to cover the newly realized insurers’ costs and associated unknown risks (Table
1.2). The increase in premiums to cover the costs and unknown risks may leave
previously insured assets without insurance and greatly exposed to losses24,25. Premiums
will also probably increase as a result of socio-economic development, but this is region
specific and uncertain26.
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Table 1.2. Ten costliest events ordered by insured losses worldwide 1980-2015 Source:
Munich Re.
Date

Event

25-30.8.2005

Overall

Insured

losses in

losses in

US$ m

US$ m

United States: LA, MS, AL, FL

125,000

60,500

1,720

Earthquake,

Japan: Aomori, Chiba, Fukushima, Ibaraki,

210,000

40,000

15,880

tsunami

Iwate, Miyagi, Tochigi, Tokyo, Yamagata

Hurricane Sandy,

Bahamas, Cuba, Dominican Republic,

68,500

29,500

210

storm surge

Haiti, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, United States,

38,000

18,500

170

Hurricane Katrina,

Affected area

Fatalities

storm surge
11.3.2011

23-31.10.2012

Canada
6-14.9.2008

Hurricane Ike

United States, Cuba, Haiti, Dominican
Republic, Turks and Caicos Islands,
Bahamas

23-27.8.1992

Hurricane Andrew

United States: FL, LA; Bahamas

26,500

17,000

62

22.2.2011

Earthquake

New Zealand: Canterbury, Christchurch,

24,000

16,500

185

43,000

16,000

813

44,000

15,300

61

22,000

12,500

44

25,000

12,000

Lyttelton
1.8-15.11.2011

Floods, landslides

Thailand: Phichit, Nakhon Sawan, Phra
Nakhon Si Ayuttaya, Phthumthani,
Nonthaburi, Bangkok

17.1.1994

Earthquake

United States: Northridge, Los Angeles,
San Fernando Valley, Ventura

19-24.10.2005

Hurricane Wilma

Bahamas, Cuba, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico,
United States

Drought

June September 2012

United States: AR, CO, GA, IA, IL, IN,
KS, KY, MO, MS, MT, NE, OH, OK, SD,
TN, TX, WI, WY

Premiums are the initial cost of an insurance policy. High initial costs generally
deter customers and this includes insurance premiums21. Financial viability of policies
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relies on the application of differential pricing for different cover limits and
deductibles21. If total-coverage premiums are priced too high for a majority of
consumers, then many will choose lower cost policies with less coverage. If these are not
available or are also priced too high, then many consumers may choose not to purchase
insurance, which reduces insurance profits and exposes the consumer to risk7,24,27.
High premiums may be a sign from insurers that there is a large amount of risk or
uncertainty or that more risk management by at-risk parties is needed21. Losses from
disaster events were found to be rising faster than premiums in some cases7. If premiums
increase too quickly, consumers may choose not to insure or governments may intervene
to set limits on premiums where premiums are priced too high for the majority of
policyholders, which in both cases may cause insurers to not offer coverage21, as in
Florida in 201028.
Where premiums are unable to reflect the true costs of a policy, methods of risk
reduction are needed, such as adaptation measures. Individual adaptation or societal
mitigation can lead to a decrease in risk to insurers25,28,29. There are financial benefits of
adaptation to climate change27 such as cost savings associated with a reduction in risk. In
a hard-market scenario, where recent events led to higher premiums and full adaptation
(i.e. all buildings retrofitted to meet building code 2004 in Florida), annual premium
costs were projected to decrease to $5-6 billion after adaptation compared to $10-14
billion with the existing status of buildings28. If all structures also met the requirements
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set forth by the Institute for Business and Home Safety, the losses from a 1-in-500-year
hurricane hitting Florida would be reduced by 50% compared to current levels28.
Empirical studies show many people do not voluntarily invest in adaptation
measures even when they are cost effective29. The challenges of reducing the impact of
natural disasters is clear from recent catastrophes and the losses associated with them, as
well as the failure of residents in these hazard-prone areas to invest in adaptation
measures29,30,31. Yet, strong market pressure and marketable solutions have been shown
to incentivize people to adopt adaptation measures, such as catastrophe bonds which
transfer peak risks to capital markets30.
Experts commonly assess weather-related risks by making best estimates of the
probability and potential damage of a hazard using statistical techniques or catastrophe
models10. These expert assessments, however, often have little influence on actual
decision making about risk by lay persons32. Lay persons often use very simple rules
when they assess risks, which can be described as heuristics33. Media outlets are
becoming more interested in climate change issues and expert opinions are being brought
more to light, changing the frame of media coverage34. Individuals may use a so-called
‘availability heuristic’ in judging natural hazard risk, which implies that they judge an
event as risky when it is easy to imagine or remember32. People’s perception of risk often
reflects the automatic, emotional, non-analytic thinking rather than a statistical
concept26,35. This perception of risk can influence people’s decisions for insurance
coverage and other preparations for natural catastrophes.
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A combination of measures that limit damage and reduce the probability of
natural catastrophes has been shown to be the most effective way of reducing extreme
costs36. Insurers may require households to undertake such measures to mitigate damage
or to take precautionary measures29,37,38. These measures may also lead to policy benefits
such as premium discounts or higher levels of coverage due to increased risk reduction
behaviors39. These behaviors may also reduce post-disaster risk due to failures in
structures or environmental contaminants after a disaster40. Precautionary measures have
seen some success internationally, such as the flood damage in Germany during the
extreme flood of the Elbe in 200239,40,41. Another example is through the National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP) in the U.S. that, after setting compulsory mitigation standards,
reduced flood losses on new structures by a factor of six42, but the NFIP failed to restrain
development in flood plains potentially due to premiums not being risk based and being
subsidized43. Past experiences from other countries show mitigation measures at a
household level can be effective in limiting flood damage, reducing costs for insurers
over the long term39. This same experience may be applied to other aspects of insurance
with further research.
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Table 1.3. Ten costliest flood events ordered by insured losses worldwide 1980-2015
Source: Munich Re.
Date

1.8-15.11.2011

Event

Floods, landslides

Affected area

Overall losses

Insured losses

in US$ m

in US$ m

43,000

16,000

813

16,500

3,400

39

United Kingdom: England

4,000

3,000

4

Austria, Czech Republic,

12,500

3,000

25

Thailand: Phichit, Nakhon Sawan,

Fatalities

Phra Nakhon Si Ayuttaya,
Pathumthani, Nonthaburi,
Bangkok
12-22.8.2002

Floods, flash floods

Germany, Austria, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Moldova,
Switzerland, Slovakia

25-30.6.2007

Floods, severe
storms

30.5-19.6.2013

Floods

Germany, Hungary, Poland,
Switzerland
20-23.7.2007

Floods

United Kingdom: England, Wales

4,000

3,000

1

10-14.1.2011

Floods, flash floods

Australia: Queensland, Brisbane,

3,200

1,900

22

3,300

1,800

11

5,700

1,600

4

Ipswich, Toowoomba, Grantham,
Gladstone
20-28.8.2005

Floods

Austria, France, Germany,
Hungary, Slovenia, Switzerland

19-24.6.2013

Floods, severe

Canada: Alberta, Calgary,

storms

Canmore, High River, Medicine
Hat, Bragg Creek

October -

Floods

United Kingdom, Ireland

2,000

1,500

10

Floods

United States: MS, MO, IA, IL,

21,000

1,300

48

November
2000
27.6-15.8.1993

ND, IN, MN, WI, KS, NE, SD
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How might insurers appeal to policyholders to adopt mitigation and adaptation
measures? One possible solution is multi-year contracts, which would make the benefits
of adaptation clearer as the probability of a disaster during the time frame would be
higher22,29,30. Another possible solution provides incentives to households to limit
damage from floods by purchasing relevant materials and taking related action37,39.
Insurance companies can incentivize policyholders by abandoning riskier markets, raising
premiums, insisting on greater deductibles or lowering coverage, and refusing to insure
property without a list of protective measures44. Other incentives used in the past to
reduce risk include founding of government services in areas previously without the
service (e.g. fire departments) and regulations (e.g. advocating for building codes or auto
safety)19. Though potentially effective, these measures are similar to building waste
treatment facilities for a polluted river rather than redesigning the processes that dumped
the effluents into the river44. More proactive engagement of risk management is a
valuable investment and ultimately reduces insured losses45. In crop insurance, insurers
may offer a premium discount if the insured adopted a risk reducing practice. For
example, premiums were reduced where producers planted a specific drought-tolerant
corn hybrid that was later widely adopted and the discount discontinued.

Feedbacks via Non-coverage
Inaction is a major factor contributing to negative economic impacts from climate
change45. Non-coverage is the undesired result of inaction, of which there are two
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subtypes. The first is where insurance premiums are not allowed to reflect true risk,
leading insurers to not offer a policy. The second type of non-coverage is when
premiums are allowed to reflect true risk, but the premiums and deductibles (amount paid
out-of-pocket for a claim) are too costly for the consumer to purchase the policy9,40,45.
Both scenarios result in uninsured property, persons, or development that leave
consumers, industry, and the economy at risk.
Non-coverage is a market failure associated with the forceful mechanisms of the
insurance industry on society. Non-coverage is the result of a lack of communication and
ability to provide feedback between society and the insurance industry. As a result, we
can view non-coverage as an indicator of where failure in these mechanisms occur. Noncoverage can also be used as a deterrent of compounding harmful behaviors related to
climate change similar to non-coverage as a deterrent for other safety and health
violations7, 27,45.
In the case of a standard insurance policy, two conditions must be met in order for
insurers to willingly offer insurance23. Insurers must be able to quantify the probability
and severity of an uncertain event, and insurers must be able to set premiums for each
customer or group of customers23. As further climate science and related research is
completed and becomes publically available, the comprehension of climate change as a
risk source increases and the probability of non-coverage decreases. But as this
understanding increases, the perceived risks might increase, causing a rise in premiums in
order to cover the potential losses6,7,23,45. This places the economic burden on the
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consumer and can result in non-coverage by choice on part of the consumer, and result in
an availability-affordability crisis45. Non-coverage also pressures public organizations to
assume more climate risks which may lead to more federal debt, such as when the
National Flood Insurance program insured damage from Hurricanes Katrina and Ike9,24.

Figure 1.4. Financing climatic loss at different levels of risk.

Financing of risks can come from a variety of sources (Figure 1.4). The primary
source is the party itself through non-coverage (savings or working capital) for risky
events that are frequent and not severe. The next category, credit, protects against events
that are somewhat frequent and severe enough where the party converts equity into cash
in order to pay for the event. The final category, insurance, covers events that are rare and
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have high financial impacts; equity alone cannot cover the financial cost of these events.
The insurance category differs from the credit category because they communicate with
the party through an offered premium. The ability of the party to self-insure (i.e. have
available funds, as opposed to gambling) and/or have access to credit will vary highly
upon party characteristics whereas insurance will be offered across almost all
characteristics. As a result, there could exist a large gap between insurance and noncoverage.
Change in risks will lead to a change in probability of experiencing an event in
non-coverage, credit, and insurance, leading to updated communication between
insurance and parties. To lower the probability of non-coverage and credit events, as the
probability of rare, financially costly events increase (fattening of the tail in Figure 1.4),
insurance companies are required to charge a higher premium to cover higher expected
losses. This communication can lead to adaptation by the party to minimize the new risk.
In turn at some point in the future, the insurance company will lower premiums because
parties took action that lowers risk.
Events leading up to non-coverage and the effects of non-coverage can be seen in
the Saint Bernard Parish district of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina24. Hurricane
Katrina caused total insured losses ≥$41 billion46. This amount of damage and risk has
turned insurers away and now a house in the Saint Bernard Parish district (and many
other parts of New Orleans) is virtually uninsurable, causing the districts to remain near
barren as the area is unaffordable46. The risk for insurers to insure parts of New Orleans
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is extremely high and the lack of understanding of these risks also plays a part in keeping
premiums too high to afford or for a lack of available insurance46. Hurricane Katrina was
estimated as a 1-in-396-year storm, meaning that any given year has a 0.25 percent
chance of seeing such a storm by the US Army Corps of Engineers46. However, the
company Risk Management Solutions saw Hurricane Katrina as a 1-in-40-year storm
causing some dissension in interpretation of significant natural catastrophe risk46. The
lack of understanding and significant losses caused many insurance agencies to choose to
not provide coverage and a similar situation could occur in other places as more extreme
events occur (Table 1.4).

Feedbacks via Policymaking and Litigation
Laws give our governmental system power to protect its citizens and to standardize
responses to issues or problems. With the complexity of climate change, widespread
political action has either been criticized because climate change regulation may
exacerbate other problems, or favored because standardization of responses to climate
change may strengthen the effectiveness of solutions and greatly diminish problems. The
insurance industry has a role in influencing policy and regulation9,11,38.
Government policies impact the insurance industry directly by exempting parties
from liability, subsidizing insurance deductibles or premiums, engaging in reinsurance, or
providing coverage that competes with private sector insurance7. The role of government
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in natural disaster relief has decreased over the last 20 years as insurance coverage of
natural disaster relief has increased from 20% to 40% in developed countries24.
Table 1.4. Ten costliest storm events ordered by insured losses worldwide 1980-2015
Source: Munich Re.
Date

25-30.8.2005

Event

Overall losses

Insured losses

in US$ m

in US$ m

United States: LA, MS, AL, FL

125,000

60,500

1,720

Hurricane Sandy,

Bahamas, Cuba, Dominican Republic,

68,500

29,500

210

storm surge

Haiti, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, United

38,000

18,500

170

Hurricane Katrina,

Affected area

Fatalities

storm surge
23-31.10.2012

States, Canada
6-14.9.2008

Hurricane Ike

United States, Cuba, Haiti, Dominican
Republic, Turks and Caicos Islands,
Bahamas

23-27.8.1992

Hurricane Andrew

United States: FL, LA; Bahamas

26,500

17,000

62

19-24.10.2005

Hurricane Wilma

Bahamas, Cuba, Haiti, Jamaica,

22,000

12,500

44

23,000

11,800

120

Mexico, United States
7-21.9.2004

20-24.9.2005

Hurricane Ivan,

United States, Caribbean, Venezuela,

storm surge

Colombia, Mexico

Hurricane Rita,

United States: FL, LA, MS, TX

16,000

9,600

10

United States, Cuba, Jamaica, Cayman

18,000

8,000

36

11,000

7,300

350

10,000

6,900

178

storm surge
11-14.8.2004

Hurricane Charley

Islands
22-28.4.2011

20-27.5.2011

Tornadoes, severe

United States: AL, AR, GA, IL, LA,

storms

MO, MS, OK, PA, TN, TX, VA

Tornadoes, severe

United States: AR, GA, IL, IA, IN,

storms

KS, KY, MD, MI, MN, MO, NC, NE,
NY, OH, OK, PA, TN, TX, VA, VT
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Many countries with smaller economies are finding significant trouble in
financing natural disaster relief due to budget constraints, limited tax bases, and existing
debt24. While countries with large economies still have a buffer to protect them from
these widespread losses, as the rate and severity of natural disasters increases, the ability
of this buffer to protect nations from the crippling effects of widespread losses is
dwindling in the wake of disasters9,24. Reliance on outside aid from other nations is a risk
as there is no contractual obligation for donor aid and this type of disaster relief is subject
to political and societal uncertainty24. As the need for more effective natural disaster
relief becomes apparent, many governments are beginning to rely on insurance as a major
tool to provide a reliable system to their citizens9,24,45.
Insurance has a role in creating policy and regulation as well. The Affordable
Care Act had several influencing factors in its design and implementation but
contributions from the health insurance industry played a key role in the eventual
compromised bill27. The insurance industry’s influence brought them several victories in
the bill including lower shares of medical costs over the governments cost involvement
compared to early proposals of the bill, nearly complete eradication of government rate
regulation, and most importantly, government subsidies for low-income clients27. Health
insurance is but one facet of the insurance industry. Other bills have been influenced that
involved other sectors of the insurance industry, such as life insurance, property and
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casualty insurance (mostly on a state level rather than a federal level), and crop
insurance. Another example of government and insurance industry interaction is in the
Federal Crop Insurance program. The government interacts with the insurance companies
by sharing in reinsurance losses and gains. For example, if there was a widespread
drought the insurance company will share with the government in payments to producers.
Alternatively, if premiums were larger than payments (a reinsurance gain) then the
government receives a portion of the gain. The level of sharing depends upon the size of
the loss. Larger losses, which puts pressure on the company to fail, are absorbed at a
higher rate by the government. This risk sharing strategy aims to provide efficient and
effective disaster relief by minimizing the probability of insurance company failure and
government expenses in providing ad hoc disaster aid packages.
The insurance industry influences government and society through campaign
donations, lobbying, advertisements, and other monetary and social means. On a national
level the Affordable Care Act brought together proponents of health insurance on a
matter that affects all of them and high levels of influence was shown27. The insurance
industry also has lobbying influence at the state level of government where the bulk of
insurance regulation is drafted27. If the same level of influence is brought to climate
change insurance issues, which affect every sector directly or indirectly, the insurance
industry can have input to the laws and regulations (or lack thereof) that contribute to
climate change costs and be a key part of compromise solutions.
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The insurance industry interacts with the public sector in providing protection
against risks though there is always disagreement over the allocations of costs7. In the
Saint Bernard district of New Orleans, the insurance agencies sent assessors allegedly not
to help those stricken by the disaster but to avoid paying out on their policies by asserting
that damage was caused by floods and not wind47. The insurance agencies had policies
that offered protection against wind damage while the government provided policies that
offered protection against flood damage (through the National Flood Insurance
Program)47. The lack of cohesion in the economic response to Hurricane Katrina is one
example of non-optimized risk allocation that resulted in $109 billion in post-disaster
assistance and $8 billion in tax relief provided by the government48. For insurance and
government to be more efficient and effective at disaster adaptation, mitigation, and
relief, there must be more cooperative policy, but due to the immense costs from climate
change there will probably continue to be significant disagreements over the distribution
of costs between the two sectors.
Litigation from insurance to government has been the result of ineffective policy
or failure to reasonably foresee and adapt to the impacts of climate change. In 2013, The
Farmers Insurance Co. sued the city of Chicago, Illinois for damages caused by storm
water and sewage overflow on the basis that the local municipalities knew that the
drainage systems were inadequate but failed to take reasonable action to prevent these
damages48. The charges were eventually withdrawn by Farmers Insurance Co., stating
that the important issues were brought to the attention of the respective cities and
counties and with the hope that policyholders’ interests will be protected in the future48.
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As climate change impacts are further researched and understanding of these impacts
grows, it is probable that more government entities will be held responsible for damages
caused by climate change if proactive action is not taken to increase system resiliency48.
Higher insurance losses and more claims due to the impacts of climate change will
increase the pressure of feedback from the insurance industry to government and will
probably increase the amount of litigation unless insurance and government work
together to protect policyholders and adapt and mitigate to the impacts of climate change.

Conclusion
Properly priced insurance delivers value to consumers when it covers events that are both
rare and highly costly to individuals but common to society25. Natural catastrophes fit
this category and can have devastating costs that affect members of society and the
insurance industry49. The occurrence and severity of these natural catastrophes are
increasing9,10,24. Increased losses will challenge insurance systems to adapt and offer
affordable coverage and society to adapt and mitigate impacts from climate change10.
Risk financing systems, including insurance, will need to be cautious of downside risks
that can cause disincentives, market failures, and decrease equity10. Through improved
research, the interactions between the insurance industry and society can create more
efficient and effective risk management strategies for public and private interests to
address the challenges from climate change10. The risk from climate change to insurers
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comes from its changing nature. The earth is a complex adaptive system, and nonlinearity leads to unintended and unexpected outcomes that are unforeseeable.
Encouraging proactive cooperation between private insurers and government can increase
the likelihood that mitigation techniques and adaptation can align incentives to protect the
environment. Premiums and policy-based adaptation, non-coverage, and policy making
and litigation all provide forceful feedbacks from insurance to society. Feedback from the
insurance industry to society affects all levels of insurance and so affects the interactions
of the insurance industry across all industries (e.g. energy, infrastructure, agriculture,
health). With investments in these industries, the insurance industry will be extensively
affected by climate change. The insurance industry will continue to be a forceful and
extensive mechanism to drive adaption and mitigation measure to climate change impacts
in the absence of, and alongside, effective government policies.
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Chapter 2
The Effect of a Financial Incentive on Renewable Energy Production
Introduction
To mitigate climate change and develop competitive renewable energy, the need for
financial incentives (defined as a payment or concession that incites or tends to incite to
action or greater effort, or as a reward for increased productivity) is largely accepted as
fact among those in renewable energy50. The opposition to providing incentives for
renewable energy often occurs because incentives are seen as either aid from the
government or an additional tax. Most financial incentives are largely based in
government policies and there is often disagreement on incentives among groups with
competing interests50,51, whether it is the nature of the incentive itself or the origin of the
incentive. The political nature of incentives can serve to limit the number of incentives
offered for renewable energy and to hinder the production of smaller scale utilities52.
Large utility companies that depend on coal, and some on nuclear, for electricity
generation make entrance into the electricity market difficult for small scale utilities or
intermittent utilities that deliver renewable electricity52. The first chapter of this thesis
discussed the climate externalities of fossil fuels as captured in premium prices and the
insurance industry. The real costs of climate change (Chapter 1) are not included in the
prices of fossil fuels, because these externalities are not recognized; a phenomenon
similar for a wide range of products, such as produce or wood production53. Renewable
energy incentives provide necessary support for entry into the market when externalities
are not included in the price of fossil fuels.
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Incentives provide a firm foundation to enable new products to enter a market. If
society prioritizes renewable energy production it is imperative for incentives to be
offered so that renewable energy sources can compete with industries like oil, natural gas,
coal, and other fossil-fuel based industries, which receive their own subsidies and have
not comprehensively incorporated externalities50. According to the U.S. Energy
Information Administration, coal-produced energy accounted for 16% of total primary
energy consumption in 2015. Natural gas-produced energy accounted for 29%, oilproduced accounted for 36%, nuclear energy accounted for 9%, and all renewableproduced (hydro-electric, geothermal, solar/PV, wind, and biomass) accounted for 10%
of consumption54. In total, fossil fuels accounted for 81% of total primary energy
consumption in 2015, and only 19% from non-fossil fuel sources.
Incentives help lower the starting costs of a utility and can serve to bring the cost
of renewables to an economically competitive level in the current market, one without
adequately priced externalities55. Electricity purchase from renewable sources is low
(around 2-3%) except in cases where there are strong incentives such as tax exemptions
for electricity consumers56. Garcia et al.50 says “Given the comparatively higher costs of
renewable technologies (e.g. wind, solar) there appears to be a consensus on the need for
regulatory intervention to promote investment in these technologies.”
In the United States, incentives differ from state to state and the types and amount
of incentives vary greatly. According to the Database of State Incentives for Renewable
Energy (DSIRE), which was created in a joint effort by the U.S. Department of Energy
and the North Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center, there exists only 19 total
renewable energy incentives in Nebraska, of which only a few are available for large-
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scale or small-scale utilities and the rest being residential options or policies.
Comparatively, California (known for its progressive environmental stance and laws) has
nearly 180 different renewable energy incentives, of which a larger proportion are
available to large-scale utilities and more options for residential and small-scale utilities.
This is in part due to the nature and political climate of Nebraska energy. Nebraska is the
only state with 100% public power meaning all utilities are publically owned and are
legislatively mandated to use the most inexpensive and reliable energy sources.
For large-scale utilities to be developed, incentives must also be developed to
allow renewable energy utilities to be competitive with fossil-fuel based utilities55. The
purpose of this chapter is to compare state and federal scenarios that incentivize
renewable energy development. Data were used to examine the effects an incentive has
on the price of energy and on the revenue needed to break even within a large-scale
renewable utility. The need for incentives to develop renewable energy projects are
discussed as well as the capital needed to provide these incentives if renewable energy
production is a priority for society.

Methods
To compare state and federal scenarios for incentives for renewable energy development,
an existing cost model was needed to calculate the total cost of a large-scale utility and
the cost of energy for that utility. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL)
published a document that highlighted several cost models called Renewable Energy Cost
Modeling: A Toolkit for Establishing Cost-Based Incentives in the United States57. To
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establish a standard, only one model was needed. The California Renewable Energy
Transmission Initiative (RETI) model (Black & Veatch Corp.) was chosen due to its
simplicity in calculating costs and the omission of extraneous variables. This model is
not limited to one renewable energy technology so it is versatile in the scenarios it can
handle.
While the inputs to the model are basic and may not be sufficient in some
environments, it has all the inputs needed to generate a cost of electricity (COE)
analysis57. The model takes into account several factors including user-defined equity
return requirements, debt parameters, operation costs, taxes, and several other inputs. The
most important inputs for the purpose of this paper are the incentives. Creating incentives
for electricity producers to adopt renewable energy technologies allows public policies to
be aimed at stimulating technical change and learning processes that enable costs to be
brought down to an economically competitive level55. Incentives are not based on
resources and do not have an inherent cost to them. They are highly variable and can
play a significant role in making renewable energy cost-effective55,58. If escalation
assumptions (the assumed rise in costs of a component of energy production over time)
are given (Fixed O&M escalation, Variable O&M escalation, etc.) then the model
generates a levelized cost of energy (LCOE) which is the main output of the system. The
LCOE is the generalized cost of energy in order for the project to break even over the
lifetime of the project. Standard technology assumptions were held constant in the RETI
model (values shown in Table 2.1).

28

Table 2.1. Standard Technology Assumptions section of RETI model with assumed
standard values
Project Capacity (MW)

60

Capital Cost ($/kW)

$2,000

Fixed O&M ($/kW)

$35

Fixed O&M Escalation

2.50%

Variable O&M ($/MWh)
Variable O&M Escalation

$10
2.50%

Fuel Cost ($/MBtu)

$0

Fuel Cost Escalation

0.00%

Heat Rate (Btu/kWh)

0

Capacity Factor

37%

Misc Revenue ($/MWh)
Misc Escalation

$5
2.50%

Degradation

Values were changed to better reflect the actual total cost of an average wind farm
but due to data constraints many values were set at the default RETI model standards.
Project capacity was set at 60 MW to reflect an average large-scale wind energy project
in Nebraska59, specifically modeled after the Flat Water wind farm near Humboldt,
Nebraska. Capital cost was set at $2,000 per kilowatt (kW) to reflect average capital
costs60. Fixed Operation & Maintenance (O&M) costs were set at $17/kW as the average
cost61. Variable O&M are the costs associated with O&M that may change depending on
the amount of electricity generated. This value was set as the default value from the
RETI model along with the escalation of both O&M costs. Fuel cost was set at $0, fuel

2%
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cost escalation at 0%, and Heat Rate at 0 BTU/kWh because of the nature of wind energy
electricity generation. Capacity factor is the percentage the plant is operating compared to
the maximum (if it was operating all the time). The capacity factor was set at 37% as the
average capacity factor61. Miscellaneous revenue, escalation and degradation were set at
$5, 2.5%, and 2% respectively as the default values from the RETI model. Some values
were kept at the default setting of the RETI model due to a lack of easily accessed data
for wind energy farms and because they are simply standard values and are not subject to
analysis they were set as the default for the sake of ease. Standard Financial/Economic
Assumptions were held constant in the RETI model (values shown in Table 2.2).

Table 2.2. Standard Financial/Economic Assumptions section of RETI model with
assumed standard values
Debt Percentage
Debt Rate

60%
6.50%

Debt Term (years)

15

Economic Life (years)

25

Percent 5-year MACRS

100%

Percent 7-year MACRS

0%

Percent 15-year MACRS

0%

Percent 20-year MACRS

0%

Energy Price Escalation

2.5%

Tax Rate

39%

Cost of Equity

7.75%

Discount Rate

8.000%
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Debt percentage, debt rate, debt term, economic life, percent 5-year MACRS,
energy price escalation, and cost of equity were set as the default values of the RETI
model because they were common values (debt term, economic life) associated with
renewable energy projects or were project-dependent variables and no one value was
commonly attributed to it (debt percentage, debt rate). The tax rate was set to 39% as the
average tax rate61. The discount rate was set to 8.00%61.
The RETI model gives the LCOE as the main output. The LCOE serves as the
point of comparison for the scenarios outlined in this article. Three scenarios were
modeled using the RETI model and with LCOE as the output. First, a null scenario was
created using the default standards (listed in Tables 2.1 and 2.2) with no incentive.
Second, a Renewable Energy Tax Credit scenario was factored into the model. This
scenario kept all values as the null scenario except for the incentive category, which was
changed to $0.50/MWh. Third, a Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit scenario
was developed in which a large incentive currently offered federally (Renewable
Electricity Production Tax Credit) is factored into the model.
The total amount needed to break even (total revenue is equal to total costs over
the lifespan of the project) is calculated by multiplying the LCOE times the capacity of
the project (60 MW), the number of hours in 25 years (81,030), and the capacity factor
(0.37). The values for capacity, capacity factor, and hours of operation were added to the
existing incentives section of the RETI model to show the relevant data for the
calculation of total amount to break even. This value was added to visualize the total
amount of revenue needed over the lifespan of a project to offset its costs in a way that is
more approachable than LCOE. The total amount to break even of each project is
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compared below, in order to analyze which scenario provides the most amount of support
for renewable energy production and by how much. The purpose of this analysis is to
discuss how incentives provide support for renewable energy production and to
determine the differences between a relatively small incentive (the Nebraska incentive)
and a larger incentive (the Federal incentive).

Results/Discussion
With no incentive as a standard for comparison, the total amount to break even was
$532,756,044.00 (Table 2.3). This means that over the life of the project (25 years) the
wind farm must make $532,756,044.00 simply to offset the costs of the project.

Table 2.3. Incentives section of RETI model with values for no incentive.
PTC ($/MWh)

$0.00

PTC Escalation

0.0%

PTC Term (years)

0

ITC

0%

ITC Depr Basis

0%

LCOE ($/MWh)

$109.58

Capacity Factor

0.37

Hours of Operation
Total Amount to break even

81030
$532,756,044

32

The total amount to break even in Table 2.3 accounts for only the costs and
revenues from the renewable energy project developer with no cost reduction from an
incentive. However, it serves as a more understandable basis for comparison between the
presented scenarios. The null scenario total amount to break even compared to the total
amount of the Nebraska incentive shows a savings of $5,445,216 over the life of the
project (Table 2.4). With the Nebraska incentive, a renewable energy producer would
expect to spend $5,445,216 less before offsetting costs and generating a profit, compared
to the null scenario (without any incentive). However, no incentive compared to the
federal incentive shows a difference of $126,115,092 over the life of the project (Table
2.5). With the Federal incentive, a renewable energy producer would expect to spend
$126,115,092 less before offsetting costs and generating a profit, compared to the null
scenario.

Table 2.4. Incentives section of RETI model with values for the Nebraska incentive.
PTC ($/MWh)

$0.50

PTC Escalation

0.0%

PTC Term (years)

10

ITC

0%

ITC Depr Basis

0%

LCOE ($/MWh)

$108.46

Capacity Factor

0.37

Hours of Operation
Total Amount to break even

81030.00
$527,310,828.00
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Table 2.5. Incentives section of RETI model with values for the Federal incentive.

PTC ($/MWh)
PTC Escalation
PTC Term (years)

$23.00
0.0%
10

ITC

0%

ITC Depr Basis

0%

LCOE ($/MWh)

$83.64

Capacity Factor

0.37

Hours of Operation
Total Amount to break even

81030
$406,640,952

These differences are comprised solely from the money given to the utility by the
incentive program. If the incentive is a state government program compared to a federal
program, then the money given to the utility ultimately comes from the taxpayers of that
state. In the absence of adequately priced externalities, this money appears to be a cost.
When compared to a system that prices these externalities, however, the costs of fossilfuel based energy production are greater than the money invested in renewable energy
development53. Nebraska had a population of 1,868,516 people in 2013 according to the
United States Census Bureau62. Taking the total savings of the Nebraska incentive
(~$5.4 million) and dividing it by the population of Nebraska (~1.87 million) gives a cost
of $2.91 per person over the course of 25 years (the life of the project) or a little under
$0.12 a year per person. The Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit saw a savings
of $126,115,092 over the life of the project compared to the null scenario. This amount
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divided by Nebraska’s population shows a cost of $67.49 per person over the life of the
project or $2.70 per person per year. Nebraska generated 34,217,293 MWh in 2012
according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration63. This generation divided by
the MWh produced by the renewable energy development (81030 hrs x 60 MW x 0.37 =
1,798,866 MWh) gives 19.02 which is the number of electricity generation facilities at 60
MW capacity and with a capacity factor of 0.37 needed to meet total electricity
generation for Nebraska in 2012. The incentive amounts of $0.12 and $2.70 per person
per year become $2.28 and $51.35 per person per year if all electricity production in
Nebraska is generated from renewable energy plants with similar values to the standards
set in Tables 2.1 & 2.2 and are incentivized with a program similar to the Renewable
Electricity Production Tax Credit.
The amount needed to break even with the Nebraska incentive is an optimal
situation in which the program budget is large enough to cover any and all production of
electricity from a renewable resource. The program, however, is limited by a budget of
$50,000 per year according to DSIRE. This means that for all projects using the
incentive the total amount of tax credit given cannot amount to more than $50,000 per
year. So a project is actually limited to $1,250,000 over the course of 25 years assuming
it gets all $50,000 of the program budget. When several projects are using this incentive
at the same time the projected savings of a project is significantly lower, meaning it is
less probable that more renewable energy production will develop.
Molly Sherlock64 states that the PTC has been important to the growth and
development of renewable electricity resources, particularly wind. However, Sherlock
argues that tax incentives may not be the most economically efficient way to correct for
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the distortions in energy markets. Tax subsidies (such as a large number of renewable
energy incentives are) reduce the average cost of electricity, increasing demand overall.
This counters the energy efficiency and emissions reduction objectives.

Conclusion
Incentives serve as a building block for market entry. In a market that is dominated by
oil and gas companies, where externalities are not priced adequately, it can be nearly
impossible for renewable energies to become competitive. That’s why it is vitally
important for incentives to play a part in renewable energy generation technologies if
development is desired. Without an incentive or other financial tool to make market
entry easier many renewables simply do not have the capability to enlarge their market
share and establish themselves in the market.
An incentive can be a powerful tool in developing large-scale renewable energy
generation projects. While the models were simulated with an average size wind farm
similar incentives can be found for other renewables as well. Larger-scale wind projects
are also already running or currently in production in Nebraska59. However, as energy
demand increases more and larger renewable energy production facilities must be built to
meet demand and to meet energy emission standards. As the capacity of a system
increases the total cost of the project, the LCOE, and the total amount to break even
increases. So a higher demand for energy leads to an increase in energy production,
leading to more and larger energy projects, leading to increased initial costs, leading to
potentially more costs for incentives. This increase is offset by lower energy prices over
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the life of the renewables and more development leads to an increase in market relevance.
Incentives serve as a way for a technology or product to enter a market but does not
dictate what happens once it is established. So as the market share of renewables
increases the need for incentives will decrease.
A large portion of the accumulated research on regulatory design for renewable
energy compares alternative options to incentivize it, rather than whether or not it should
be incentivized50. Examples of this being Butler & Neuhoff51, Menanteau55, Lipp65, and
Mitchell et al.66. This leads to the conclusion that it is generally accepted that regulatory
incentives are needed for renewable energy development. However, there has been some
success in some electricity markets for hydro-electric power without incentives67. The
key differences being base-load power (a constant source rather than an intermittent
source such as wind or solar) and long life spans of hydroelectric projects which are
projected at 50 years typically68 compared to 25 years for wind.
Renewable energy technology has a higher investment cost compared to nonrenewable energy technology and is an intermittent source of electricity68. Nonrenewable energy technology has a lower investment cost but has additional fuel
expenditures and carbon emission costs69. There is much research on renewable energy
and the potential future for renewables in the current electricity system50,55,66,69,70. This
chapter shows the effect incentives have on renewable energy production and the costs
associated with those incentives. In a market without adequately priced externalities,
fossil-fuel based energy production is significantly cheaper53 than renewable based
energy production. When the externalities of fossil-fuel based energy production (impacts
of climate change) are accounted for the true costs of fossil-fuel based systems become
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much higher than renewable energy production. In the absence of a system that prices
externalities for fossil fuels, incentives serve as a way to enable renewable energy
development and act to indirectly mitigate the impacts of climate change.
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